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\If an organization is going to function well,
it should not rely solely on monetary compensation schemes."
Akerlof and Kranton (2005)
1 Introduction
Awards are increasingly popular in the corporate sector, where managers consider inno-
vative human resource practices, such as awards, to be essential for rm competitiveness
(Ichniowski and Shaw 2003). In his book 1001 Ways to Reward Employees, Nelson (2005)
provides ample evidence of the number and variety of awards in companies. The prevalence
and popularity of awards in the corporate sector suggest that awards fulll important func-
tions in principal-agent relationships. However, to date there is no clear empirical evidence
on the eect of these kinds of social incentives on performance.
Using an event study technique that exploits the matched nature of our panel data, we
are able to causally identify the eect of receiving an award on subsequent employee per-
formance in the call center of a large international bank. Specically, the data set is unique
in that the awards studied are directed towards valuable activities such as substituting
for colleagues or making improvement suggestions, which are uncorrelated with the perfor-
mance measured in the call center. This feature ensures the exogeneity of the intervention.
We nd that award winners substantially increase their subsequent performance relative to
both nonrecipients and their own previous performance. This result is robust to alternative
specications that check the validity of the identifying assumption and the specics of the
econometric technique used. Hence, the receipt of an award enhances performance even
inf job dimensions that are not incentivized with the award. The documented ex-post per-
formance enhancement adds to the presumably positive impact on the rewarded activity
itself and the incentive eect of the award system per se, and it suggests that awards are
valuable incentive instruments that should be taken seriously as additional instruments in3
principal-agent relationships.
How do these predominantly nonmonetary, reputation-based rewards t into the
economic literature where they have been basically ignored to date? Previously, when
economists studied incentives in organizations, the focus was on monetary payments in
exchange for performance on specic, measurable dimensions. This is illustrated by the
large literature on incentive pay to align the interests of principal and agent starting with
the pioneering works by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). In
recent years, works in behavioral economics have explored a wider set of motivations in
the workplace such as status (Auriol and Renault 2008), concerns for social recognition
(Brennan and Pettit 2004) and positive self-image (B enabou and Tirole 2002), feedback
(Suvorov and van de Ven 2006), and identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). However, this
literature has largely been silent about how these social concerns can be instrumentalized
to induce eort in a systematic and predictable way.
Awards are a widely used means of motivating workers in organizations and we argue
that they derive their value from these kinds of social concerns. In award schemes, an agent
is given a symbolic reward for good performance in combination with positive performance
feedback and social recognition from superiors and peers. The value of an award depends
on its scarcity as a positional good as well as on the usefulness of the performance feedback
and the appreciation of the recognition. While there is no universally accepted denition of
awards, essential elements are (1) the publicity of the winners, (2) a set of deliberately vague
evaluation criteria, (3) the unenforceability of awards, and (4) their tournament character.
Although awards contain features of other motivators, such as performance bonuses, pure
feedback, gifts, and praise, they can be clearly distinguished from them.
We are aware of only a few other papers that explicitly study awards. Hansen and
Weisbrod (1972) and Frey (2005) address awards as incentives in general. Markham, Scott,4
and McKee (2002) show in a quasi-experimental setting that the introduction of a public
recognition program to reduce absenteeism decreases the latter by 52 percent. Gavrila et al.
(2005) describe the optimal solution for the management of awards over time, considering
that their incentive eect depends on the number of awards that are presented. Besley and
Ghatak (2008) analyze a principal-agent setting with social incentives, such as job titles or
awards. The decisive feature of these rewards is that they have zero marginal costs, so it
is incentive compatible for the principal to award them even if the payo is not veriable.
Elsewhere, we show that awards act as incentives, signicantly inuencing performance
before they are presented (Neckermann and Frey 2008; Neckermann and Kosfeld 2008).
Malmendier and Tate (2008) also show how the receipt of a title, like \CEO of the Year," af-
fects subsequent performance. However, their paper is concerned with extra-organizational
awards that are exogenous to the principal-agent relationship of interest. These kinds of
awards dier in essential ways from intra-organizational awards. They are presented by
a person or institution that is not the principal of the agent whose performance is aected,
for a dierent set of reasons, and they come with a dierent set of benets for the recipient.
Therefore, their ndings cannot be generalized to intra-organizational awards.
This paper contributes to the discussion of rewards by presenting the rst empirical
evidence on the eect of receiving these kinds of social incentives on performance. This
suggests that the traditional focus on monetary incentives is too narrow because other
motivators, tapped by instruments such as awards, have a signicant and systematic eect
on employee performance. Further, we show that such rewards have an independent positive
eect on behavior after they are awarded; hence, it is not sucient to consider only the
ex-ante incentive eect of rewards, that is, while employees work towards receiving them.
The signicant behavioral eect of these social incentives also ts well into the current
discussion on the disparity between the impact of monetary incentives in the lab and in5
the eld. While lab studies nd a large behavioral eect of wage increases, eort reacts
relatively little in the eld. Some authors (see, e.g., Dur [2008]) argue that this divergence
is caused by the fact that employers in the eld typically use motivators other than wages,
for example, recognition, to signal kind intentions. Therefore, employees do not reciprocate
to wage increases in the eld to the extent they do in the lab, where money is the only
means of signaling kind intentions.
Section II presents the data and the estimation technique. In Section III, the empirical
ndings are discussed and Section IV concludes.
2 Data
The data set comprises information on awards as well as the employee performance of
the 155 call center agents of a credit card service company of a large international bank
and covers the period from January 2004 to October 2007. The call center is responsible
for handling customer complaints and questions and consists of six work groups, each
with one group manager. Management considers the call center of key importance for the
company's success because it represents an important interface between the company and
its customers.
2.1 Dependent Variable: Performance
The company records daily performance for a number of dierent performance dimensions,
starting in the second month of employment to allow for initial learning. On a monthly and
yearly basis, these measures are transformed into rankings and aggregated into a single
performance index. In particular, for each dimension, the percentage deviation between
individual performance and the average monthly performance of all the call center agents
is calculated and changed into a rating between 5 (very good) and 1 (unsatisfactory),6
according to a matrix set up by the department head. As an example, an agent that
performs 120 percent of the average performance in a dimension receives a rating of 5 in
that dimension, and an agent whose performance is 80 percent or lower receives a rating of 1.
The relative nature of the performance measurement is an advantage for our study because
it ensures that all time-varying, exogenous factors that aect the absolute performance of all
call center agents are excluded.1 Specically, the measurement is not aected by an increase
in the number or diculty of calls or by improvements in the technical infrastructure. Both
of these factors render absolute performance incomparable over time. In line with exerted
eort, the relative rating further ensures that a certain number of calls answered translates
into a higher rating in slow rather than in busy months. We basically use the same index
as the company to ensure that our performance measure corresponds to the company's
assessment of good and bad performance. Because the company continually renes the
exact calculation of its performance index by adding and removing dierent performance
dimensions from it, a core performance measure was constructed in collaboration with the
call center manager. Our performance index comprises the following six dimensions that
have been part of the company's index in all of the periods covered:2
1. Calls Taken Per Hour: Average number of phone calls handled per hour.
1Theoretically, relative performance measures may have the downside that a change in ratings may not
always reect corresponding changes in eort; hence, ratings may not be comparable across months. This is
the case when a variation in the average absolute performance causes a given eort to translate into dierent
ratings in dierent months. In our setting, however, absolute performance does not exhibit a systematic
trend and typically changes only very little between two months in all dimensions. Moreover, the nature of
the task renders it highly unlikely that employee uctuation causes changes in ability distributions dramatic
enough to have a sizeable impact on absolute performance. Therefore, any change in absolute performance
that we observe likely reects changes in working conditions that should be ltered out.
2The company's changes in the index do not reect systematic and sustained improvements of per-
formance evaluation, which would have suggested that we should use the changing index too. Rather all
dimensions that are not captured in our core rating were added and removed at various instances. Examples
are the two dimensions Training, which measures an employee's performance in in-house training courses,
and Write o Policy, which measures the degree to which employees follow company guidelines on goodwill
issues. Both dimensions were in the company's index only in 2006.7
2. Call Handling Time: Average length of phone call.
3. After Call Worktime: Average amount of time needed to process the request after
the call has been ended.
4. Transfer Rate: The average ratio between calls handled by the employee and the
number of phone calls that were transferred to colleagues or other service units.
5. Lates: Number of days on which the employee showed up late for work.
6. Quality: Quality of client handling as assessed by supervisors and clients.3
Of these dimensions, only the dimension Lates is not evaluated relatively, but according
to an absolute scale (no absence corresponds to a rating of 4, one absence to a rating of 3,
and more than one absence to a rating of 1). The resulting six ratings are then combined
to a single overall rating according to the same weighting scheme used by the company.4
Specically, Quality enters with a weight of 50 percent and the ve other dimensions with
10 percent each. The weighting scheme suggests that the company places equal emphasis
on technical measures, such as the number and durations of calls, and content measures,
which capture the actual interaction between employee and customer. The resulting index
provides a global, overall assessment of performance. It captures all the relevant trade-os
the company faces, ensuring that employees do not improve their rating, for instance, by
answering more calls at the expense of call quality. The management conrmed that our
3The rating has an internal and an external component, each of which accounts for 50 percent of the
quality rating. Internal quality is assessed by the group manager by periodically monitoring the conversa-
tions of each agent. The assessment follows a clear set of rules and guidelines that leave virtually no room
for subjectivity and thereby ensure the objectivity of the measure. Evaluation criteria are, for example,
whether the agent correctly introduces herself and asks the right set of questions in the prescribed order.
The external quality rating is generated by an outside company that conducts surveys with the company's
customers.
4The addition and deletion of performance dimensions in the company's indices in dierent years were
accompanied by changes in the weights of the individual dimensions. However, the relative weights of the
six core performance dimensions remained basically identical throughout the entire time period covered.8
core index captured overall performance well and that no important performance dimen-
sion was neglected. Figure 1 exhibits the density of performance ratings.


















The performance ratings are approximately normally distributed with an average of 3.02
and a standard deviation of 0.66 and do not exhibit a time trend. The mean and variation
corroborate the objective, quantitative nature of our performance data, as subjectively
determined evaluation data typically cluster around high values (on the leniency bias see,
e.g., Murphy and Cleveland [1995]; Yariv [2006]) and may cause endogeneity problems
because managers might assess award-receiving individuals more favorably. The resulting9
index represents a weighted average of quantitative performance measures. Thus, we can
treat the rating as cardinal because it takes on many dierent values and does not have
the quality of an ordinal grading scheme.
2.2 Independent Variables: Awards
The company has a variety of awards. These are called the Thank You Reward, the Gold
Reward, the Platinum Reward, the President Reward, Employee of the Month, and Em-
ployee of the Year. The requirements for qualifying for these awards increase from Thank
You Reward to Employee of the Year. While a Thank You Reward, an email notication
and a letter sent to the employee's home address, allows a spontaneous exchange of thanks
among colleagues, the President Reward remunerates activities that have beneted the
company as a whole; these require approval by the CEO and come with a personal con-
gratulation by the department head. The winners of Employee of the Month and Employee
of the Year are selected by a reward committee and the CEO from among the winners of
the Platinum and President Rewards. For all awards, there is a close connection between
eort and likelihood of nomination, so that individuals can actively pursue winning an
award. Appendix A. contains a full description of the awards, their requirements, approval
procedures, and associated benets. The award program of the company has been in place
since 2001. Therefore, we cannot estimate how the presence of the award system per se
changes performance because there is no control group without awards. Rather, this ex-ante
incentive eect of awards is part of the baseline motivation of each employee and constant
throughout the period of our study.5
While our data set contains information on the winners of all awards other than the
Thank you Reward, only the Gold Reward lends itself to a statistical examination be-
5This incentive eect potentially changes with winning an award. One might argue that the motivation
to win decreases once an award has been won. However, such a potential change in baseline motivation
renders the detection of a positive change in performance caused by the receipt of an award more dicult.10
cause there are too few observations of call center agents winning the other, more pres-
tigious awards. The Gold Reward remunerates exceptional eorts that benet the entire
work group. Nominations can be made by colleagues as well as supervisors.6 An award is
presented by the call center manager in front of the worker's colleagues in the middle of the
following month. Award winners, as well as their colleagues, only learn about the award
then. There is no additional announcement of the award winners; however, the manage-
ment takes care to present the award when many colleagues are on hand, that is, the entire
call center as all call center agents work in one big oce. The award is accompanied by
a certicate for the wall, which serves as a reminder and ensures that agents not present
when the award is presented learn about it, as well as a symbolic bonus of around Swiss
Franc (CHF) 150. Examples of behaviors that qualify for a Gold Reward are volunteering
as a substitute during vacation times, initiating and implementing team events, making im-
provement suggestions, and helping others with good advice. Importantly, awards are not
presented for the performance used as the dependent variable in our analysis. In fact, core
performance is uncorrelated with the activities that lead to an award. Awards are therefore
exogenous, and their causal eect on core performance can be identied by comparing the
performance of winners and nonrecipients subsequent to winning. If awards depended on
performance, they would always be|at least, in part|a reection of good performance,
and a careful creation of control groups would be necessary to identify the causal eect.
The data set comprises 46 awards (Gold Reward January 2004 to Gold Reward October
2007). Overall, 158 Gold Rewards were presented to the 155 call center agents between
2004 and 2007. As expected, the distribution is skewed to the right. Two agents received
6About half of the nominations come from group supervisors and the other half from colleagues. The rea-
sons provided for the nominations do not dier systematically between those by supervisors and colleagues.
The Human Resources Department communicates the criteria for nominations well, so almost all nomina-
tions result in an award. Interviews with group managers and employees further suggest that employees
deserving an award are not ignored, especially as so many individuals can nominate.11
a total of eight Gold Rewards, whereas 76 got none.7 These numbers suggest that the
award is suciently scarce for it to be valuable to its recipients, and the sample is well
balanced between winners and nonrecipients because about half of the agents never received
an award. On average, 3.4 awards are presented per month with a minimum of zero and
a maximum of 11.
2.3 Further Data Information
The data set comprises a total of 1480 id-month observations.8 Sixty-three percent of the
agents in the sample are female, and the agents remain in the sample for 18 months on
average.
The call center agents are paid a xed monthly wage of CHF 4,500 (about $4,500).
The exact sum the individual receives depends on her level of experience, knowledge of
languages, and length of employment at the call center. The Gold Reward complements
the company's salary scheme because it incentivizes activities such as substituting for col-
leagues or organizing team events that are not remunerated as part of the xed wage. The
management asserted that receiving a Gold Reward had no eect on future promotion deci-
sions and award winners did not receive special attention, training, or other advantages, for
which we cannot control. Hence, while in-house training presents a positive shock to pro-
ductivity, it is not correlated with winning awards; therefore, it does not cause systematic
biases because they are not correlated with winning an award.
7Figure 3 in the Appendix shows the entire frequency distribution of the number of Gold Rewards per
employee.
8The initial data set comprised some additional id-month observations that were lost because one or
more performance dimensions were not recorded in a particular month due to vacation, sick leave, or failure
of the manager to assess the dimension Quality.12
3 Awards and Performance
3.1 Empirical Specication
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the eect of awards on subsequent performance, one
needs a control group of individuals that is identical to those in the treatment group
(the group of award winners) in all relevant observable and unobservable factors. Then,
the performance of individuals in the control group provides a valid counterfactual for
the performance of award winners, and the eect of an award can be estimated as the
average dierence in performance between individuals in the two groups. Typically, control
groups are constructed ex-post via matching procedures (see Angrist and Krueger [1999]
for an overview). In our particular case, a Gold Reward is directed towards behaviors such
as supporting colleagues and organizing team events that are not captured in the core
performance rating. This unique feature of our data set suggests that there is no dierence
in the core performance of award winners and nonrecipients prior to the award. Therefore,
we can make the identifying assumption that award winners and nonrecipients of the Gold
Reward are homogeneous in all factors|other than a xed eect that we estimate for each
individual|that drive core performance prior to winning an award. The quality of this
matching (i.e., the validity of our identifying assumption) will be tested as part of the
analysis below.
Therefore, to estimate the eect of receiving an award on subsequent performance, we
use an event study technique that allows us to estimate period-specic eects both before
and after a Gold Reward is won.9
The following table presents an overview over the three dimensions used to identify and
quantify the eect of a Gold Reward on employee performance:
9A similar technique to study period-specic eects of events was used, for instance, by Greenstone and
Moretti (2003) and Peters and Wagner (2008). Event studies have a long history in economics and are used
in a variety of settings. An overview is presented in MacKinlay (1997).13
Table 1: Dimensions of Identication Strategy
Dimension Value Use
Time relative to event
Before bestowal of Gold Reward
vs. after bestowal of Gold Reward
Allows testing the homogeneity of
winners and nonrecipients with respect
to core performance prior to the
bestowal of a Gold Reward.
Type of performance
Core Performance vs. behaviors
that qualify for a Gold Reward
a
Ensures exogeneity of event (Gold
Reward) on core performance
(dependent variable).
Treatment
Winner of Gold Reward vs.
nonrecipient
Identication of the size of the eect of
a Gold Reward on core performance.
a The Gold Reward recognizes exeptional eorts that are unrelated to core call center duties. Examples
of behaviors that qualify for a Gold Reward are volunteering as a substitute during vacation times or
implementing team events.
Under the identication strategy presented above, the causal eect of receiving an award
on employee performance is estimated by tting the following equation:
Yit =  +
T X
=T
Wi + i + Xit + it: (1)
The dependent variable Yit represents the performance rating of employee i in period
t. Because Yit is constructed as the weighted average of the ratings in the individual per-
formance dimensions discussed above, it takes on many dierent values and can be treated
as continuous (see, e.g., Wooldridge [2002], p. 533). The index  denotes the time period
relative to t and is measured in months.  runs from  6 to +6 and is normalized so that
 = 0 refers to the current month t;  < 0 refers to months prior to t;  > 0 refers to months
after t. The range of  determines the size of the event window. The indicator variable i
controls nonparametrically for employee xed eects, such as level of education and gen-
der.10 Because the resulting panel is unbalanced, the use of dummy variables is preferable
10In principle, one could also control for time- and award-specic eects. However, the relative nature of14
to xed eects as controls for individual-specic eects (see, e.g., Greene [1997], p. 623).
Xit is a vector of time-varying observable characteristics of the individual, in our case, the
length of employment in the call center.  represents a constant, and it is a stochastic
error term. To calculate standard errors, we cluster on the workgroup level per year.11
Alternative ways of adjusting standard errors are discussed below.
The key variables in this regression are the Wi indicator variables. Wi equals 1 for
a person i who receives a Gold Reward  from t, and zero otherwise. As the Gold Reward
is open to all employees in all periods, Wi captures all the relevant information because
each employee is either a winner or a nonrecipient in each month. The vector  are the pa-
rameters of interest in this equation and capture the period-specic eects on performance
of winning a Gold Reward  months from the current time period t as compared to not
winning an award, conditional on all covariates. By including an indicator variable for each
period, the eect of being a winner is allowed to vary with . For example, a coecient
+2 = 0:5 means that the performance of employees who won a Gold Reward two periods
ago is 0.5 points higher than the one of nonrecipients. The time series of the coecients 
around the event ( = 0) allows us to detect the causal eect of an award on performance.
If the coecients were signicantly positive before the award was presented, there would
be concerns about reverse causality. In case the performance of winners and nonrecipients
is indistinguishable prior to an award for a large number of periods, we can be condent
that our identifying assumption about the homogeneity of winners and nonrecipients holds.
As all individuals are winners or nonrecipients with respect to multiple awards, every
our performance measure already eliminates period-specic, exogenous shocks to performance. In addition,
the Gold Rewards in the individual months that we cover are identical, so there is no reason to expect
independent award-specic eects.
11We do not have obvious problems with grouped errors as the unit of observation corresponds with the
unit of variation, i.e., the award. However, clustering on workgroups accounts for possible correlations of
ratings within teams. As team composition varies between years due to employee uctuation, workgroup-
per-year clusters are used. This also increases the number of clusters, which improves inference due to the
asymptotic properties of the clustering procedure (Kiefer 1980; White 1980).15
performance observation simultaneously helps to identify all 13 dierent  from +6, the
performance of winners relative to nonrecipients six months prior to an award, to  6, the
performance of winners relative to nonrecipients six months after an award.
3.2 The Performance of Winners and Nonrecipients
Figure 2 shows the average-mean-corrected performance of winners and nonrecipients
around the award.12
The gure suggests that the performance of winners and nonrecipients is indistinguish-
able prior to an award and that the performance of winners increases relative to nonrecip-
ients in the period following the award.
This rst impression is conrmed in a regression analysis that controls for further factors
and accounts for potential serial correlation. Table 2 presents the results when estimating
equation (1) for two dierent subsets of employees. The rst model includes all id-months
observations with clean event windows. This means that those id-month observations are
included where at most one of the winner dummies, Wi, equals one to eliminate confound-
ing eects. Model 2 only includes the id-month observations of those employees that have
received at least one Gold Reward. As the entire sample is now comprised of Gold Reward
recipients, our identifying assumption holds per denition because winners and nonrecip-
ients in this sample are homogeneous in their underlying unobservable characteristics. In
case the results of model 2 are identical to those of model 1, we can further strengthen our
identifying assumption that winners and nonrecipients|even those who never receive an
12The sample of nonrecipients used to calculate the mean-adjusted performance comprises the perfor-
mance ratings of those nonrecipients that are in teams with at least one winner in the respective month
t. Excluded are the performance ratings of those nonrecipients that win a Gold Reward within six months
around t.16
Figure 2: Performance of Winners and Nonrecipients Prior to and After an Award
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award|are homogeneous.
According to model 1, the performance of winners is 0.24 or 7.4 percent higher than that
of nonrecipients one month after the award. This increase is substantial, especially when
taking into account the large number of Gold Reward winners at the call center and that we
use performance in a job dimension that is not incentivized with the award as the dependent
variable. Two months after the award, the dierence in performance becomes insignicant.
Consistent with our homogeneity assumption, we nd that, in each of the six months prior
to an award, recipients and nonrecipients have very similar performance ratings. Indeed,
their performance ratings are statistically indistinguishable for this relatively large number17
Table 2: Impact of an Award on Performance (Six Months Before and After the Event)










































t statistics in parentheses
 p < :10,
 p < :05,
 p < :0118
of periods. Overall, this nding lends credibility to the identifying assumption that the
nonrecipients form a valid counterfactual for the winners. We do nd, however, that the
xed eects of winners are, on average, higher than that of agents who never receive an
award. While this implies that winners and nonrecipients are indeed not homogeneous
with respect to their absolute core performance, they are homogeneous with respect to
their core performance once these level eects have been taken into account because of the
long time line of insignicant dierences in performance prior to the award.13 Moreover, the
results for model 2 closely resemble those of model 1, which further speaks against reverse
causation. The control variable job tenure does not have a robust statistically signicant
eect on performance.
Result 1. Awards increase the performance of recipients as compared to nonrecipients
subsequent to winning.
The same is true when using change in performance as the dependent variable. The
winners' performances increase signicantly more than the nonrecipients' performances be-
tween the month prior to the award and the month after. A closer look at performance in
the individual performance dimensions shows that the overall result (i.e., the sizes of the
coecients and their signicance levels) is clearly reected in the Quality dimension and,
to a lesser extent, in the dimension After Call Worktime. Performance also increases in all
other performance dimensions, but the eect size and the specic lags that exhibit signi-
cant coecients dier between dimensions and are not strong enough to have a signicant
13In fact, this implies that employees that are productive in terms of the core performance are also
the ones that engage in voluntary work behaviors and hence that there is no trade-o between the two
kinds of activities. One might counter that awards are given to the productive types not because they
actually engage in voluntary work behaviors, but because they collude with supervisors to gain additional
compensation for their high performance. However, we can show that within the rst ve months at the
company, employees who receive an award exhibit a higher core performance than those who never receive
an award (Mann-Whitney test p-value: .07, one-sided). As employees at the beginning of their careers lack
the necessary familiarity with their supervisors and the unwritten rules of the company, this supports the
notion that it is in fact the high-performing individuals engaging in voluntary work behaviors rather than
low-performing types.19
eect on the overall rating. However, these ndings should be interpreted with care because
only the aggregate rating is a useful measure of performance due to the trade-os between
the dierent dimensions.
3.3 Development of Performance Over Time
Analyzing the performance of winners and nonrecipients over time serves as a check for
whether winners increase their performance not only relative to nonrecipients, but also
relative to their own performance prior to winning. For the following nonparametric anal-
ysis, we use performance ratings that are corrected for individual-specic xed eects and
eect of tenure to make the analysis comparable to the regressions above. Comparing the
performance of winners between the month of the award and the subsequent month (i.e.,
periods  = 0 and  = +1), the one-sided t-test for paired samples suggests that perfor-
mance is signicantly higher ( = 0:05, p-value: .03) in the month after the award than in
the month of the award. In contrast, the performance in the month prior to the award is
not statistically dierent from the one in the month of the award. The average increase in
performance between the month prior to the award and the month after the award is 0.16.
There is no statistically signicant dierence in performance between any of these three
months for nonrecipients (i.e., between the periods  =  1,  = 0, and  = +1). Given that
performance is relatively evaluated, that is, in comparison with the average performance
in each month, which is driven by the large number of nonrecipients, this insignicance
was to be expected. This implies that the observed increase in the relative performance
measure for the winners may be driven by nonrecipients lowering their performance. This
would be reected in a deterioration of absolute performance. However, this is not the case.
Absolute performance over the four years stays relatively stable. In particular, we do not
detect a general trend in absolute performance or any individual performance dimension. In
fact, there is a slight increase in absolute performance because quality increases somewhat.20
Hence, we can be sure that the observed increase in the ratings of the winners represents
higher winner eort.
Result 2. Receiving an award improves the performance of winners, whereas the perfor-
mance of nonrecipients remains unaected.
3.4 Why Do Winners Work Harder?
The observed increase in performance subsequent to winning an award can be attributed to
induced feelings of organizational commitment. Akerlof and Kranton (2005), for instance,
state that employees who identify with their company perform better and that employers
can actively inuence whether employees identify with the company. Specically, initiation
rites, such as award ceremonies, can be used to change self-perception.14 Our evidence,
however, suggests that a Gold Reward does not cause a sustainable change in preferences
(i.e., employee identity) because the eect is limited to the month subsequent to winning.
Endocrinical studies suggest that hard-wired mechanisms can raise the performance of
award winners. Increases in status caused, for instance, by a victory in a competition
have been shown to be associated with a heightened level of testosterone. This in turn
increases competitive behavior (Booth et al. 1989; Mazur and Booth 1998). Such eects
can be interpreted as preference changes in economics, even though they aect behavior
only for a short time after the occurrence of the change in status (i.e., for a number of
hours after winning an award). Psychological evidence also suggests that a positive event,
which induces a good mood, increases subsequent voluntary behavior when this is in line
with the positive cognitions evoked by the event (Isen and Simmonds 1978). At the same
time, receiving an award can also induce reciprocal actions (e.g., Fehr and G achter [2000]
14According to Akerlof and Kranton (2005), cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1954) is the underlying
psychological mechanism that drives this development of loyalty. Applying cognitive dissonance theory to
awards implies that individuals, who have publicly accepted an award and thereby the rules and values of
the organization, improve their views and valuation of the organization.21
or Kube, Mar echal, and Puppe [2008]). According to this theory, winners increase their
eorts to reciprocate to the monetary bonus associated with winning the Gold Reward .
However, it is highly unlikely that the entire eect we document is driven by the monetary
bonus. First, the amount is small|only 3 percent of the average monthly salary of around
CHF 4,500. Second, eld studies have shown that the wage elasticity of workers' outputs
ranges from roughly 0.15 to 0.44 (Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder 2008). Thus, the observed
increase of 7.5 percent would require a wage increase between 15 to 50 percent. This
corresponds to a bonus of between CHF 750 and 2,500, which is much higher than the
actual amount of CHF 150. Another explanation for the observed increase in performance
may be the increased visibility of the award winner in the month following the award.
Recipients may feel a need to live up to the honor of having received an award for their
voluntary work behaviors, and this may aect their core performances. This eect should
be stronger for award winners whose core performance was below average prior to the
award. The data allow us to test this hypothesis by separating the winners into two groups:
those individuals who performed below average in  = 0 and those who performed above
average. Looking at how much performance increases between the month of the award
and one month later, we nd that, on average, the rating of low performers increases by
0.58, whereas the performance of high performers decreases by 0.17. The one-sample t-test
indicates that both coecients are highly signicantly dierent from zero. This dierential
impact of winning an award supports the notion that the increase in performance is caused
by social pressure or the winners wanting to live up to the award with respect to core
performance. At the same time, the dierentiated eect renders it highly unlikely that
reciprocity or organizational commitment causes the increase because this should apply to
under- and over-performing winners in the same manner. However, the dierentiated eect
could also be caused by mean reversion. Individuals who achieve a very good rating likely22
had extreme positive draws from the process generating their output. Their next draws are
unlikely to meet or exceed prior realizations, causing their individual performance to revert
to the population mean. Therefore, we use a longer time horizon to classify individuals as
high- or low-performing. Specically, we look at  = +2,  = +1, and  = 0. Individuals
that perform worse than average in two or three of those periods are classied as low
performers. Low-performing winners increase their rating by 0.29 (which is signicantly
greater than zero at the 1 percent level), while the rating of high-performing winners
changes by 0.03 (not signicantly dierent from zero).15 Therefore, while there is some
mean reversion going on, the dierential impact of awards on the rating of high- and
low-performing agents is robust.
Arguments rationalizing the observed eect without resorting to social motives unlikely
play a role here. The award system is well established and the criteria clear to all employ-
ees. Therefore, handing out the award should not change the relevant information of the
agents on the type of behavior and the required eort level to win. Further, the small
bonus of CHF 150 unlikely changes the opportunity set of the agents or causes an income
eect that could explain the result. Moreover, if there were any income eect, it would
aect performance in the opposite direction and only strengthen the result that winning
the award triggers employees to work harder. A Gold Reward has no impact on future pro-
motion decisions, and employees know that. Strategic considerations about trying to win
the award again also cannot explain the nding because this would not explain a further
increase in performance above the level that was sucient for winning. Further, if strategic
considerations were the motive, the increase should last for more than one period. However,
above all, any increase in core performance is by denition of the award criteria not linked
15The average rating of high performers in the month when they win an award is 3.52 (std. dev. 0.32),
which suggests that the performance of high performers is not bounded from above, and they have the
scope to increase their performance the same as low performers.23
to a higher chance of winning another Gold Reward because these reward activities are not
captured in the core rating.
We can also rule out that the eect is caused by award winners focusing on those
activities that lead to the award at the expense of core performance prior to winning. If
the argument were true, the observed increase in performance after the award would only
represent a return to the normal level of core performance, and winners and nonrecipients
would not be homogeneous despite the similarity of their performance prior to the award.
While such an eect could be imagined if one only looked at the three months prior to an
award|the maximum time span that an activity eligible for winning lasts|the long time
series of insignicant performance dierences prior to an award renders the conjecture
invalid. In addition, the dierence in performance after an award should then also be
sustained for more than one month.
Regarding the size of the eect, it is worth observing that the sizes of the documented
eects only present a lower bound due to three reasons specic to this study. First, the Gold
Reward is low in the hierarchy of awards at the company, and one would expect to nd
even larger eects for the other awards. Second, awards at the company are presented for
benecial behaviors that are not represented in the company's core performance measure,
which we use as the dependent variable. Thus, the estimated eect of awards on core
performance presents only the spillover eect of the presumably larger eect on those
behaviors that are rewarded. One standard objection to award systems is that they induce
individuals to exert unproductive eorts to increase their chances of winning. Our result,
however, provides evidence to the contrary, as we observe an increase in productive eort.
Hence, even if there were some rent seeking going on, it does not come at the expense
of productivity. Third, we only measure the impact of the award subsequent to being
presented. However, the award system as such does have an incentive eect that, while it24
cannot be captured in this study, probably has a substantial impact on the performance
of all employees as they work towards the award. In a eld experiment, Neckermann and
Kosfeld (2008) nd that the introduction of an award system increases performance by
about 10 percent.16
3.5 Robustness
The following section addresses a variety of issues concerning the reliability of our results.
As is the case with most, if not all, event studies, our disturbances exhibit serial corre-
lation. However, this issue does not aect our results because we estimate robust standard
errors. Specically, we report the robust (Huber-White sandwich) estimates of variance
that provide correct estimates for any type of correlation within the observations of each
panel/group. Moreover, Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that, if the inter-
vention variable is not serially correlated, OLS standard errors are consistent, despite the
positive serial correlation in the residuals. This holds in our study because the average
correlation of the independent variable over time for each individual is close to zero. Serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity are more extensively addressed, and additional tests are
reported in Appendix C. As a further robustness check we used the two-way cluster ap-
proach (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2006), which provides cluster-robust inference when
there is two-way clustering that is non-nested. The two dimensions that we checked were
id and month because one could image errors to be clustered for all observations of one
individual and within one month. However, our results are robust to this test as Table 3
in the appendix shows.
We already established above that the direction of causality runs from award to per-
formance by showing (1) that there is no signicant dierence between the performance of
16Receiving an award may also have other benecial side eects that cannot be measured as part of this
study. For example, one might conjecture that awards have an additional positive aect on the retention
rates of the award winners.25
winners and nonrecipients prior to an award and (2) that the results of models 1 and 2 are
basically identical. Nevertheless, we additionally tested whether current or lagged perfor-
mance determines if a person receives a Gold Reward. As expected, there is no signicant
eect of these variables on the likelihood of receiving an award. Only the length of tenure
and its squared term have a signicant impact, which provides an additional rationale for
including these variables in the regressions presented above. Third, the results are robust
with respect to the inclusion and exclusion of employees depending on the number of Gold
Rewards received. The results do not change with a variation in the event window size (we
tested event windows ranging from plus/minus 3 to 12 months). In addition, the inclusion
of time xed eects has no eect on the results, which we expected because the relative
rating already eliminates any impact of time-varying changes in the business environment.
We can also conrm that our result is not driven by the large weight of 50 percent of Qual-
ity in the index. Using a dierent index that weights all performance dimensions equally
leads to the same pattern of performance, both in terms of the size of coecients as well
as signicance levels.
4 Conclusion
In general, the use of incentives is indispensable in principal-agent relationships within
organizations. Advances in behavioral economics have recently addressed and presented
models of a wide set of human motivations such as the desire for status and positive
self-image. However, awards as incentive instruments tapping a number of such motives
have so far been neglected in economics despite their widespread use in the corporate sector
and elsewhere.
This study shows that receiving an award for uncontractible, voluntary work behaviors
such as organizing team events or substituting for sick employees increases core perfor-26
mance|those eorts that are more immediately linked with business success by 7.5 percent
when compared to nonrecipients. To our knowledge, this study is the rst to empirically
assess the change in behavior induced by the receipt of an award in a principal-agent
relationship. This study is unique in that it analyzes performance in a complex work
environment|a task that is characterized by many dierent job dimensions including
quality. Specically, we show in the eld that social incentives have a sizeable and ro-
bust positive eect on employee performance. Moreover, rewards inuence behavior after
they have been received, that is, beyond the incentive eect normally considered as people
work towards receiving the reward. This clearly contradicts the notion that awards only
inuence behavior due to their eect on future monetary income and that awards only
reect high ability and performance, but do not cause it. Hence, incentive theory neglects
an important part of the value of rewards. Additionally, awards as social incentives have
a positive spillover eect on dimensions of the job that they do not target.
Social incentives may turn out to be invaluable in incentivizing types of activities that
are desirable for the company, but not contractible. The vague nature of awards, for in-
stance, better corresponds to the vague nature of activities such as helping colleagues or
sharing knowledge. Therefore, employees may perceive social incentives to be a more ad-
equate reward for these kinds of activities than monetary bonuses that put a clear dollar
value on the exerted eort. Thereby, awards are less likely to reduce intrinsic motivation
(see, e.g., Frey [1997]; B enabou and Tirole [2003] on the crowding out of motivation). At
the same time, multitasking problems may less likely occur. Moreover, social rewards may
have a positive impact on the work climate and the shared beliefs about appropriate kinds
of behavior. There is much scope for future research. One relevant question concerns the
optimal number of awards and award categories. Additionally, a deeper understanding of
all channels through which awards aect performance might improve our understanding of27
incentive provision in principal-agent relationships.
Appendix
A. Awards at the Company
A.1. The Thank You Reward
The Thank You reward is exchanged between colleagues. Whenever an employee chooses
a colleague for a Thank You reward, the recipient immediately receives a notication per
email and a letter is sent to her home address. Once a month, the three employees with
the highest number of Thank You rewards receive gifts (if two employees have the same
number of awards, a lottery decides). The rst prize is dinner for two (value CHF 200);
the second prize is travelers' checks (value CHF 100); the third prize is two cinema tickets
(value CHF 40).
A.2. The Gold Reward
The Gold Reward is presented for extraordinary, non-contractual performance with an
impact on the output of the whole work group. Each employee can nominate a colleague
for a Gold Reward. Approval is required by the group manager of the nominated employee.
Each Gold Reward is accompanied by a certicate for the wall as well as a bonus between
CHF 100 and CHF 250 ($100 and $250). The reward is presented by the call center manager
in front of the other team members. Additionally, the names of the winners are published
on the intranet and listed in the monthly company newsletter, and the winners receive
a trophy, which has their names engraved on it.28
A.3. The Platinum Reward
The Platinum Reward is handed out (1) for exceptional eorts beneting the whole depart-
ment or (2) for extraordinary performance over an extended period of time. Moreover, the
behavior of the winner must clearly represent the values of the organization. Special atten-
tion is given to actions that further cooperation and collaboration across departments. As
is the case with a Gold Reward, colleagues nominate individuals for a Platinum Reward.
Both the department head as well as the supra-departmental reward committee have to ap-
prove the nomination. The Platinum Reward is presented by the human resources manager
and comes with a bonus of between CHF 300 and CHF 750 ($300 and $750) and a trophy.
The names of the winners are published on the intranet, listed in the monthly company
newsletter, and additionally mentioned at the yearly Christmas ceremony. The Platinum
Reward is presented much less frequently than the Gold Reward. Between 2004 and 2007,
it was awarded to only seven employees in the call center. In general, call center employees
have little scope to aect the performance of the whole department or to establish and
foster cooperation between the departments. Hence, they have only limited opportunities
to qualify for a Platinum Reward.
A.4. The President Reward
The nomination and approval procedure for the President Reward is identical to the one
described for the Platinum Reward. However, this award requires the CEO's approval. The
President Reward requites eorts that have beneted the company as a whole. As only
a few activities meet this requirement, there are only a few President Rewards each month.
Examples of actions that qualify for the President Reward are process innovations that
save costs or discoveries of major credit card frauds. The President Reward comes with
a trophy and an amount between CHF 1,000 and CHF 2,000 (the amount is about the same29
in US$). The names of the winners are published on the intranet, listed in the monthly
company newsletter, and additionally announced at the yearly Christmas ceremony.
A.5. The Employee of the Month
Each month, a committee chooses one of the Platinum and President Reward winners of the
previous month as the Employee of the Month (Gold Reward winners are also considered
when there are too few Platinum and President Reward winners). The title is awarded to
that Platinum or President Reward winner who made the most signicant contribution,
in particular, a contribution that aects the success of the organization as a whole. The
nomination requires approval by the CEO, and the award is presented by the human
resources manager, often together with the CEO. The award comes with the privilege of
using a company mini Cooper (including gasoline) in the respective month and a trophy.
Between 2004 and 2007, ve call center agents were awarded this title. An email containing
a picture of the winner noties all employees of the new Employee of the Month. In addition,
the CEO mentions all Employees of the Month winners and shows their pictures at the
yearly Christmas celebration.
Gold, Platinum, and President Rewards can be won multiple times by each call center
agent and can be awarded to multiple employees in the same month. There is only one
Employee of the Month per month, and this title can be awarded to the same individual
only once per calendar year.
A.6. The Employee of the Year
At the end of each year, the reward committee and the CEO choose an Employee of the Year
from among the Employee of the Month winners. The title is awarded to that Employee
of the Month whose contribution beneted the company the most. The title is awarded at
the yearly Christmas ceremony and comes with a trophy as well as a week of paid vacation
in a summer cottage for up to six people including a generous allowance.30
B. Distribution of Gold Rewards
Figure 3: Distribution of Gold Rewards per Employee
C. Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity
C.1. Further Discussion
With these kinds of event studies, one might worry about serial correlation and het-
eroskedasticity of the disturbances, despite the fact that this issue is rarely addressed.
This would render the least squares estimator inecient and even inconsistent if the re-
gressors contain lagged dependent variables. Standard test statistics, such as the rst-order
autocorrelation coecient of the residual (coecient 0.125, signicant at 1 percent level),
obtained from regressing performance on individual characteristics (tenure and tenure2)
and individual xed eects, as well as the DW-statistic for panel data, do indeed suggest
that disturbances are positively correlated.17 Serial correlation is also detected when us-
ing the Woolridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 282{283)
(p-value: .05 for H0: no rst-order autocorrelation). We also ran the modied Wald test for
17Second- and third-order autocorrelation coecients are small (0.028 and 0.004) and insignicant.31
group-wise heteroskedasticity on the xed eect model and found a highly signicant test
statistic. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the panels in our model have common
disturbance variances and that those disturbances are not correlated with the regressors.
Hence, adjustments need to be made. If the goal were to estimate a model with complete
dynamics, we needed to respecify the model because strong serial correlation is often an
indication of omitting important explanatory variables or functional form misspecication.
However, as this was not our goal, we had to nd a way to carry out statistical inference in
light of this positive correlation and potential heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge 2002, p. 402;
Li and Hsiao 1998).
Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) discuss serial correlation as a frequent prob-
lem, typically caused by the use of a fairly long time series, the positive serial correlation
in the dependent variable, and the high degree of persistence of the intervention variable.
They used Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how several estimation techniques helped
to solve this serial correlation problem. They found that allowing for an unrestricted covari-
ance structure over time within groups, with or without making the assumption that the
error terms in all states follow the same process, worked well when the number of groups
(i.e., units to which the intervention is applied, here: individuals) was greater than 50. This
is satised in our sample. In addition, we allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix
as we cluster on the team level. Specically, clustering implies that the model is estimated
by OLS applying the robust (Huber-White sandwich) estimates of variance. These variance
estimates are robust in the sense of providing correct coverage rates to much more than
panel-level heteroskedasticity (when only panel-level heteroskedasticity is present, a GLS
estimation would be more ecient; otherwise, the GLS estimates are incorrect). In particu-
lar, they are robust to any type of correlation within the observations of each panel/group.
Moreover, Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that, if the intervention vari-32
able is not serially correlated, OLS standard errors are consistent, despite the positive serial
correlation in the residuals. This is true in this study where the average correlation of the
award variable over time for each individual is  :05 (correlation coecients vary between
 :31 and :47 with a mode and median of  :05).
To further check the robustness of the reported standard errors, we recalculated them
according to other methods suggested in the literature. In particular, we applied OLS
with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) assuming heteroskedastic and contempora-
neously correlated disturbances across panels (a method initially suggested by Beck and
Katz [1995]). Analogous to the clustering approach presented above, applying OLS with
PCSE errors provides consistent, but inecient estimates in the face of heteroskedastic
and correlated errors. In some sense, the PCSE approach is the opposite to the clustering
approach because it allows for correlation among observations at the same period and in
dierent panels, but only for certain types of within-panel correlation, here AR(1). The
estimates that were calculated with the Prais-Winsten FGLS (Prais and Winsten 1954)
assuming an AR(1) process in the disturbances, do not dier in any meaningful way from
the ones presented above. The same holds, when we apply the Driscoll and Kraay standard
errors for xed eect models (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). These standard errors are robust to
general forms of cross-sectional (spatial) and temporal dependence when the time dimen-
sion becomes large. Because this nonparametric technique of estimating standard errors
places no restrictions on the limiting behavior of the number of panels, the size of the cross-
sectional dimension in nite samples does not constitute a constraint on feasibility|even
if the number of panels is much larger than T. Hence, we are condent that the standard
errors reported in the table are accurate.33
C.2. Regressions With Two-Way Clustering
Table 3: Models with One-Way (Team-Month Basis) and Two-Way (Id and Month) Clus-
tering
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
one-way two-way one-way two-way
 6  0:055  0:055  0:069  0:069
( 0:54) ( 0:53) ( 0:67) ( 0:62)
 5 0:123 0:123 0:117 0:117
(1:37) (0:87) (1:31) (0:77)
 4 0:100 0:100 0:098 0:098
(1:40) (1:25) (1:47) (1:18)
 3 0:076 0:076 0:080 0:080
(0:76) (0:72) (0:84) (0:72)
 2  0:013  0:013  0:008  0:008
( 0:13) ( 0:12) ( 0:09) ( 0:07)
 1  0:028  0:028  0:020  0:020
( 0:39) ( 0:31) ( 0:29) ( 0:21)
0  0:034  0:034  0:022  0:022






(2:73) (2:04) (2:96) (2:00)
+2 0:015 0:015 0:035 0:035
(0:12) (0:12) (0:29) (0:25)
+3 0:172 0:172 0:192 0:192
(1:03) (1:24) (1:19) (1:31)
+4  0:005  0:005 0:017 0:017
( 0:05) ( 0:06) (0:17) (0:16)
+5  0:050  0:050  0:022  0:022
( 0:85) ( 0:62) ( 0:40) ( 0:25)
+6 0:005 0:005 0:033 0:033




(1:76) (1:83) (0:95) (0:82)
Tenure
2  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000










t statistics in parentheses
 p < :10,
 p < :05,
 p < :0134
References
Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton, \Identity and the Economics of Organizations,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2005), 9{32.
Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz, \Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization," American Economic Review, 62 (1972), 777{795.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger, \Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics," in
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3, Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds.
(New York: Elsevier Science, 1999).
Auriol, Emmanuelle, and R egis Renault, \Status and Incentives," The RAND Journal of
Economics, 39 (2008), 305{326.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz, \What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series
Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 634{647.
B enabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole, \Self-Condence and Personal Motivation," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117 (2002), 871{915.
, \Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, 70 (2003), 489{
520.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, \How Much Should we Trust
Dierences-in-Dierences Estimates?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2004), 249{
275.
Besley, Timothy, and Maitreesh Ghatak, \Status Incentives," American Economic Review,
98 (2008), 206{211.35
Booth, Alan, Greg Shelley, Allan Mazur, Gerry Tharp, and Roger Kittok, \Testosterone,
and Winning and Losing in Human Competition," Hormones And Behavior, 23 (1989),
556{571.
Brennan, Georey, and Philip Pettit, The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and
Political Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Cameron, Adrian C., Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller, \Robust Inference with
Multi-Way Clustering," NBER Working Paper No. 327, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2006.
Driscoll, John C., and Aart C. Kraay, \Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with
Spatially Dependent Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80 (1998),
549{560.
Dur, Robert, \Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?" IZA Discussion
Paper No. 3839, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany 2008.
Fehr, Ernst, and Simon G achter, \Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (2000), 159{181.
Fehr, Ernst, Lorenz Goette, and Christian Zehnder, \The Behavioral Economics of the
Labor Market: Central Findings and Their Policy Implications," IEW Working Paper No.
394, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Switzerland,
2008.
Festinger, Leon, \A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," Human Relations, 7 (1954),
117{140.
Frey, Bruno S., Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1997).36
, \Knight Fever: Towards an Economics of Awards," IEW Working Paper No. 239,
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Switzerland, 2005.
Gavrila, Caius, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gustav Feichtinger, Gernot Tragler, and Richard F.
Hartl, \Managing the Reputation of an Award to Motivate Performance," Mathematical
Methods of Operations Research, 61 (2005), 1{22.
Greene, William H., Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1997).
Greenstone, Michael, and Enrico Moretti, \Bidding for Industrial Plants: Does Winning
a \Million" Dollar Plant Increase Welfare?" NBER Working Paper No. 9844, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.
Hansen, William L., and Burton A. Weisbrod, \Toward a General Theory of Awards, or,
Do Economists Need a Hall of Fame?" Journal of Political Economy, 80 (1972), 422{431.
Ichniowski, Casey, and Kathryn Shaw, \Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of the
Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 17 (2003), 155{180.
Isen, Alice M., and Stanley F. Simmonds, \The Eect of Feeling Good on a Helping Task
That is Incompatible with Good Mood," Social Psychology, 41 (1978), 346{349.
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, \Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (1976),
305{360.
Kiefer, Nicholas M., \Estimation of Fixed Eect Models for Time Series of Cross-Sections
with Arbitrary Intertemporal Covariance," Journal of Econometrics, 14 (1980), 195{202.37
Kube, Sebastian, Michel A. Mar echal, and Clemens Puppe, \The Currency of Reciprocity {
Gift-Exchange in the Workplace," Working Paper No. 377, Institute for Empirical Re-
search in Economics, University of Zurich, Switzerland, 2008.
Li, Qi, and Cheng Hsiao, \Testing Serial Correlation in Semiparametric Panel Data Mod-
els," Journal of Econometrics, 87 (1998), 207{237.
MacKinlay, Archie C., \Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic
Literature, 35 (1997), 13{39.
Malmendier, Ulrike, and Georey Tate, \Superstar CEOs," NBER Working Paper No.
14140, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.
Markham, Steven E., K. D. Scott, and Gail H. McKee, \Recognizing Good Attendance:
A Longitudinal, Quasi-Experimental Field Study," Personnel Psychology, 55 (2002),
639{660.
Mazur, Allan, and Alan Booth, \Testosterone and Dominance in Men," Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 21 (1998), 353{363.
Murphy, Kevin R., and Jeanette N. Cleveland, Understanding Performance Appraisal.
Social, Organizational and Goal-Based Perspectives (Thousand Oaks, USA: Sage Publi-
cations, 1995).
Neckermann, Susanne, and Bruno S. Frey, \Awards as Incentives," IEW Working Paper No.
334, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Switzerland,
2008.
Neckermann, Susanne, and Michael Kosfeld, \Working for Nothing? The Eect of Non-
Material Awards on Employee Performance," Mimeo, Institute for Empirical Research
in Economics, University of Zurich, Switzerland, 2008.38
Nelson, Bob, 1001 Ways to Reward Employees, 2nd ed. (New York: Workman Publishing
Company, 2005).
Peters, Florian S., and Andreas F. Wagner, \The Executive Turnover Risk Premium," Swiss
Finance Institute Research Paper No. 08-11, Swiss Finance Institute, Zurich, Switzer-
land, 2008.
Prais, Sigbert J., and Christopher B. Winsten, \Trend Estimators and Serial Correlation,"
Discussion Paper No. 383, Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, 1954.
Suvorov, Anton, and Jeroen van de Ven, \Discretionary Bonuses as a Feedback Mecha-
nism," Working Paper No. 0088, Center for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow,
Russia , 2006.
White, Halbert, \A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Di-
rect Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, 48 (1980), 817{838.
Wooldridge, Jerey M., Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2nd ed. (Mason, OH: Thomson
South-Western, 2002).
Yariv, Eliezer, \\Mum Eects": Principals' Reluctance to Submit Negative Feedback,"
Journal of Managerial Psychology, 21 (2006), 533{546.CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2593 Paolo M. Panteghini, On the Equivalence between Labor and Consumption Taxation, 
March 2009 
 
2594 Bruno S. Frey, Economists in the PITS?, March 2009 
 
2595 Natalie Chen and Dennis Novy, International Trade Integration: A Disaggregated 
Approach, March 2009 
 
2596 Frédérique Bec and Christian Gollier, Term Structure and Cyclicity of Value-at-Risk: 
Consequences for the Solvency Capital Requirement, March 2009 
 
2597 Carsten Eckel, International Trade and Retailing, March 2009 
 
2598 Gianni De Nicolò and Iryna Ivaschenko, Global Liquidity, Risk Premiums and Growth 
Opportunities, March 2009 
 
2599 Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market 
Contact, March 2009 
 
2600 Massimo Bordignon and Guido Tabellini, Moderating Political Extremism: Single 
Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule, April 2009 
 
2601 Ana B. Ania and Andreas Wagener, The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an 
Evolutionary Learning Process, April 2009 
 
2602 Simon Gächter, Daniele Nosenzo, Elke Renner and Martin Sefton, Sequential versus 
Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence, April 2009 
 
2603 Philippe Jehiel and Andrew Lilico, Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow: A Limited 
Foresight Perspective, April 2009 
 
2604 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel, Ronnie Schöb and Joachim Weimann, Dissatisfied with 
Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed, April 
2009 
 
2605 David Bartolini and Raffaella Santolini, Fiscal Rules and the Opportunistic Behaviour 
of the Incumbent Politician: Evidence from Italian Municipalities, April 2009 
 
2606 Erkki Koskela and Jan König, Can Profit Sharing Lower Flexible Outsourcing? A Note, 
April 2009 
 
2607 Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier and Çağlar Özden, Diasporas, April 2009 
 
2608 Gerd Ronning and Hans Schneeweiss, Panel Regression with Random Noise, April 
2009  
2609 Adam S. Booij, Bernard M.S. van Praag and Gijs van de Kuilen, A Parametric Analysis 
of Prospect Theory’s Functionals for the General Population, April 2009 
 
2610 Jeffrey R. Brown, Julia Lynn Coronado and Don Fullerton, Is Social Security Part of the 
Social Safety Net?, April 2009 
 
2611 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of 
Budget Deficits in the European Union, April 2009 
 
2612 Balázs Égert, The Impact of Monetary and Commodity Fundamentals, Macro News and 
Central Bank Communication on the Exchange Rate: Evidence from South Africa, April 
2009 
 
2613 Michael Melvin, Christian Saborowski, Michael Sager and Mark P. Taylor, Bank of 
England Interest Rate Announcements and the Foreign Exchange Market, April 2009 
 
2614 Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere, Should we Subsidize 
Longevity?, April 2009 
 
2615 Ronald MacDonald, Lukas Menkhoff and Rafael R. Rebitzky, Exchange Rate 
Forecasters’ Performance: Evidence of Skill?, April 2009 
 
2616 Frederick van der Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke, The Volatility Curse: Revisiting the 
Paradox of Plenty, April 2009 
 
2617 Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, Hannes Öhler and Johannes Weisser, Acting 
Autonomously or Mimicking the State and Peers? A Panel Tobit Analysis of Financial 
Dependence and Aid Allocation by Swiss NGOs, April 2009 
 
2618 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Roman Matousek and Chris Stewart, Rating Assignments: 
Lessons from International Banks, April 2009 
 
2619 Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in 
Quality, April 2009 
 
2620 Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman and Uwe Sunde, Are Risk Aversion and 
Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?, April 2009 
 
2621 Yin-Wong Cheung and Xingwang Qian, The Empirics of China’s Outward Direct 
Investment, April 2009 
 
2622 Frédérique Bec and Christian Gollier, Assets Returns Volatility and Investment 
Horizon: The French Case, April 2009 
 
2623 Ronnie Schöb and Marcel Thum, Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages 
Less Harmful, April 2009 
 
2624 Martin Ruf and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, The Taxation of Passive Foreign Investment – 
Lessons from German Experience, April 2009 
  
2625 Yao Li, Borders and Distance in Knowledge Spillovers: Dying over Time or Dying with 
Age? – Evidence from Patent Citations, April 2009 
 
2626 Jim Malley and Ulrich Woitek, Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an 
Estimated Hybrid RBC Model, April 2009 
 
2627 Jin Cao and Gerhard Illing, Endogenous Systemic Liquidity Risk, April 2009 
 
2628 Thiess Buettner and Bjoern Kauder, Revenue Forecasting Practices: Differences across 
Countries and Consequences for Forecasting Performance, April 2009 
 
2629 Håkan Selin, The Rise in Female Employment and the Role of Tax Incentives – An 
Empirical Analysis of the Swedish Individual Tax Reform of 1971, April 2009 
 
2630 Nick Johnstone and Ivan Hascic, Environmental Policy Design and the Fragmentation 
of International Markets for Innovation, April 2009 
 
2631 Spiros Bougheas, Richard Kneller and Raymond Riezman, Optimal Education Policies 
and Comparative Advantage, April 2009 
 
2632 Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and 
Antitrust Enforcement, April 2009 
 
2633 Thor O. Thoresen, Income Mobility of Owners of Small Businesses when Boundaries 
between Occupations are Vague, April 2009 
 
2634 Guido Schwerdt and Amelie C. Wuppermann, Is Traditional Teaching really all that 
Bad? A Within-Student Between-Subject Approach, April 2009 
 
2635 Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume, Hospital Competition and 
Quality with Regulated Prices, April 2009 
 
2636 Peter Diamond, Taxes and Pensions, April 2009 
 
2637 Shoshana Grossbard, How “Chicagoan” are Gary Becker’s Economic Models of 
Marriage?, May 2009 
 
2638 Roland Strausz, Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation, May 2009 
 
2639 Holger Zemanek, Ansgar Belke and Gunther Schnabl, Current Account Imbalances and 
Structural Adjustment in the Euro Area: How to Rebalance Competitiveness, May 2009 
 
2640 Harald Hau and Marcel Thum, Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. 
Public Banks in Germany, May 2009 
 
2641 Martin Halla, Mario Lackner and Friedrich G. Schneider, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Case of Benefit Morale, May 2009 
 
2642 Balázs Égert, Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries: The Role of Incentive 
Regulation and Regulatory Independence, May 2009  
2643 Christian Gollier, Expected Net Present Value, Expected Net Future Value, and the 
Ramsey Rule, May 2009 
 
2644 Sören Blomquist and Håkan Selin, Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income 
Responsiveness to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates, May 2009 
 
2645 Dominique Demougin, Oliver Fabel and Christian Thomann, Implicit vs. Explicit 
Incentives: Theory and a Case Study, May 2009 
 
2646 Francesco C. Billari and Vincenzo Galasso, What Explains Fertility? Evidence from 
Italian Pension Reforms, May 2009 
 
2647 Kjell Arne Brekke, Karen Evelyn Hauge, Jo Thori Lind and Karine Nyborg, Playing 
with the Good Guys – A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation, May 
2009 
 
2648 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Multi-Factor Gegenbauer Processes 
and European Inflation Rates, May 2009 
 
2649 Henning Bohn, A Static Model for Voting on Social Security, May 2009 
 
2650 Markus Haavio and Kaisa Kotakorpi, The Political Economy of Sin Taxes, May 2009 
 
2651 Augusto de la Torre, María Soledad Martínez Pería and Sergio L. Schmukler, Drivers 
and Obstacles to Banking SMEs: The Role of Competition and the Institutional 
Framework, May 2009 
 
2652 Tobias Lindhe and Jan Södersten, Dividend Taxation, Share Repurchases and the 
Equity Trap, May 2009 
 
2653 Assaf Razin and Edith Sand, Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: 
Political-Economy Effect, May 2009 
 
2654 Yin-Wong Cheung and Hiro Ito, A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis of International 
Reserves, May 2009 
 
2655 Bart Cockx and Bruno Van der Linden, Flexicurity in Belgium. A Proposal Based on 
Economic Principles, May 2009 
 
2656 Michael Melvin, Lukas Menkhoff and Maik Schmeling, Exchange Rate Management in 
Emerging Markets: Intervention via an Electronic Limit Order Book, May 2009 
 
2657 Susanne Neckermann, Reto Cueni and Bruno S. Frey, What is an Award Worth? An 
Econometric Assessment of the Impact of Awards on Employee Performance, May 
2009 